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11 Introduction
There have been numerous studies underlining the importance of rotating savings and
credit associations (roscas) in developing countries. Roscas are commonly found in
rural areas and in the poorer neighbourhoods of the cities in developing countries and
drive a considerable part of individuals’ savings. Bouman (1995) refers to many african
countries showing high degrees of participation and the importance of the savings im-
plied. In developed countries, these institutions are mainly used by migrants1.
A basic description of these associations can be given as follows: A group of people
gather on a regular basis for a cycle of meetings. During one meeting all members con-
tribute a ﬁxed amount of money to a common pot allocated to one of them. The latter is
excluded from the reception of the pot in subsequent meetings but is still obliged to con-
tribute to the pot for the rest of the cycle. This process repeats itself until each member
has received the pot, a cycle is then being completed. Then, the rosca may begin another
cycle or decide to discontinue. Groups vary widely between one another in terms of the
amount of contribution, number of members and frequency of meetings. In fact some
groups may function on the basis of weekly or monthly compulsory meetings whereas
others which don’t hold meetings send a member for collecting payments. Operating
modes of roscas can differ considerably. The process by which the pot is allocated can
either be done at random2 (random roscas), through a decision imposed by the governing
body of the group (decision roscas) or through a bidding process (bidding roscas).
Due to high transaction costs and incomplete markets, rosca members are mainly
poor individuals who have little access to formal savings and credit markets.3 In the lit-
terature roscas are usually regarded as a means for poor people to save money in order
to make an indivisible expense (a lumpy expenditure). Empirical analysis by Handa
and Kirton (1999) and van den Brink and Chavas (1997) conﬁrm this view. Evidence we
collected from a sample of 496 households in Cotonou, Benin, support this as well.
Rosca participation implies costs. They do not provide interest rates. Moreover,
members suffer from the risk of default from other members (which could eventually
lead to the breakdown of the rosca), from less ﬂexibility than saving on their own (as
the rosca saving rate is likely to differ from their optimal saving rate) and, in most cases,
from opportunity costs of time spent by taking part in meetings of the group.4 Despite
1See among numerous references, Srinivasan(1995) and Summerﬁeld(1995).
2This can be done once at the beginning of a cycle (establishing the order for its entire duration) or the
random draw can be repeated at the beginning of each meeting.
3As an example, a small survey of Beninese banks showed us that conditions for opening an account
in any public or private banks of Cotonou, such as a ﬁxed guarantee deposit, the possession of an identity
card (the costs of which are prohibitive) and literacy skills for the understanding of contracts all act as
strong deterrents against poor people.
4Nevertheless our evidence shows that few members if any considered meeting as valuable time
wasted. It rather seems that members like meeting and spending time together. Several groups organize
2all these costs, these groups show popularity which proves it must be beneﬁcial to their
members, who, in need of a saving device, are ready to pay for it5. This brings thus the
question as to why an individual would decide to join a rosca instead of saving on their
own.
This important question has received various answers in the literature. One for-
mulated by Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) is that roscas allow individuals to receive
the pot earlier than through individual savings and thus to buy the indivisible goods
desired before it would have been possible in autarky. This off course being the case
for all members except the last one in the cycle. A second motive for joining rosca is
that such association can act as a substitute to insurance, this being particularly true
in developing countries where markets for insurance are absent. However these two
answers appear to be unﬁt for the evidence we collected in Benin and we discuss why
below.
Yet another rationale was provided by Anderson and Baland (2002) based on the
role that roscas can play as a commitment device. Their work relies on intra-household
conﬂicts in consumption decisions and on the existence of asymmetric preferences for
household goods between men and women. Still this rationale does not ﬁt our empir-
ical ﬁndings partly because of the Beninese intra-household decision process and for
additional reasons that we will exhibit.
In the light of our evidence it appears that the fundamental reason as to why one
individual would join a rosca is rather the need of commitment due to self-control prob-
lems. If people have present biased preferences or suffer from short-term temptations
and are aware of their consequences, it is likely that they would prefer to limit the set of
options available to them. They could then adhere to a rosca to bind themselves to their
second best optimal saving rate thus securing part of their revenues against everyday
temptations. This rationale was proposed by Gugerty (2003). She argues that in the
absence of alternative commitment saving strategies, people aware of their time incon-
sistency problem would turn to roscas. Our paper distinguishes itself with respect to
the main literature in two ways. First it provides strong and original empirical ﬁndings
in favor of the self-commitment argument. While Gugerty (2003) provided some with
a limited database, our allows us to solidly complete them and provide additional evi-
dence. Second, it documents the fact that beninese spouses evolve in a non-cooperative
framework and that decision to join a rosca is an individual one. This brings additional
light along with rare studies pertaining to the African intra-household decision process.
We thus intend in the following section to describe the survey on which our analy-
sis is based. We then present in section 3 ﬁeld evidence that describe how husband and
many activities aside the pot distribution that allowed members to get involved in various ways (folklores,
singing, etc). Meetings are also a precious opportunity for exchanging information.
5See in particular Rutherford (1999) on this issue of costs.
3wife interact with each other. Section 4 investigates the self-commitment issue, section
5 presents conjectures which we then proceed to test in section 6. In section 7 we review
reasons for participation previously given in the literature and relevant alternative ex-
planations and section 8 concludes.
2 Description of our Survey
We use data we collected in 2004 in the two districts of Vossa and Enagnon located on
the outskirts of Cotonou (a city of about 1.1 million inhabitants). They are known to
the city’s authority as being the poorest. Vossa is located near an inner bay of fresh
water and has a community of ﬁshermen. Its 63 hectares are encircled by stagnating
waters and swamps which represent an important vector of disease. This district has
not yet been divided into plots, though a long term project has been launched during
our stay. Vossa is let to itself: the authorities of Cotonou have not yet paved any of
its roads even its principal axis. The recurrent and important problem of ﬂoods has
not been dealt with even if it critically and annually paralyses the area during a few
months. Enagnon, a dense slum located on the Atlantic Ocean shore, has also received
low attention and important sanitary problems have not been tackled yet. Half of its
area of 60.1 hectares has been divided into plots in 1998. Enagnon encompasses an
adjacent slum called Enagnon-plage which is inhabited with a majority of ﬁshermen
living in huts on the beach. Vossa and Enagnon are near downtown Cotonou where
a large part of their inhabitants work and commute everyday. No formal saving and
investment institutions, either public or private, such as banks and NGOs are present
in these two districts, the selection of which dates back to a ﬁrst mission in 2002 that
revealed that many informal groups such as insurance funds and roscas were active
there.
During the ﬁrst three months of 2004 we surveyed 496 households: 110 in Vossa and
386 in Enagnon (of which 116 are located in Enagnon-plage). Selection of each house-
hold was done randomly. The ﬁrst wave of interviews aimed at creating contacts, get-
ting housing information and obtaining information on each member: religion, activity,
education, work, etc. For all members older than ﬁfteen, we required enumerators to ﬁll
in a sheet detailing their expenses on durable goods incurred during the last six months
and to carefully report their expenses on non-durable goods for the week previously
ended. A second round was needed for members of informal groups. During this visit
enumerators collected detailed information on the group(s) they belong to. For a max-
imal accuracy, all members of each household were interviewed separately throughout
the successive waves of our survey so that tricky issues related to expenses or income
were only tackled privately. Particular attention was thus put on conﬁdentiality which
was strictly followed by our enumerators. Further details on our survey methodology
4can be found in Appendix 9.1.
5Total Sample Women Men
All Rosca All Rosca All Rosca
memb. memb. memb.
Participates in Rosca 0.17 (0.03) 1 (0) 0.15 (0.02) 1 (0) 0.19 (0.03) 1 (0)
Total monthly rosca contribution 1804 (256) 10492 (1452) 1646 (259) 10898 (1617) 1969 (274) 10161 (1329)
Female 0.51 (0.00) 0.45 (0.02)
Age 33.1 (0.25) 39.8 (0.97) 32.9 (0.49) 39.7 (1.09) 33.3 (0.05) 39.8 (0.87)
In couple 0.52 (0.04) 0.74 (0.07) 0.52 (0.04) 0.69 (0.09) 0.52 (0.04) 0.79 (0.06)
Primary degree 0.28 (0.02) 0.23 (0.07) 0.18 (0.01) 0.12 (0.05) 0.40 (0.02) 0.32 (0.09)
Salaried 0.12 (0.01) 0.19 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.05 (0.03) 0.22 (0.01) 0.30 (0.02)
Monthly individual income 48223 (2672) 86377 (5235) 40554 (1739) 69386 (2673) 56237 (3720) 100212 (12663)
Monthly individual expenditures 30789 (2912) 47682 (2075) 27671 (2711) 43746 (3289) 34049 (3124) 50888 (859)
Number of dependant persons 1.91 (0.19) 3.18 (0.30) 2.05 (0.12) 3.37 (0.11) 1.77 (0.27) 3.02 (0.48)
Number of months, same job 85 (2) 159 (19) 82 (2) 155 (16) 87 (5) 163 (22)
Number of months, same block 191 (15) 226 (12) 174 (19) 183 (12) 209 (11) 261 (11)
Native Language : Ashanti 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Native Language : Fon 0.33 (0.14) 0.29 (0.13) 0.31 (0.12) 0.23 (0.07) 0.34 (0.16) 0.34 (0.18)
Native Language : Popo 0.35 (0.05) 0.43 (0.09) 0.37 (0.04) 0.48 (0.13) 0.33 (0.07) 0.38 (0.08)
Native Language : Yoruba 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Native Language : Peul 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04)
Native Language : Goun 0.23 (0.12) 0.19 (0.14) 0.24 (0.10) 0.18 (0.13) 0.22 (0.14) 0.19 (0.14)
Vossa 0.58 (0.38) 0.53 (0.37) 0.58 (0.38) 0.56 (0.37) 0.58 (0.38) 0.51 (0.38)
Enagnon 0.31 (0.34) 0.25 (0.29) 0.31 (0.34) 0.23 (0.27) 0.31 (0.35) 0.27 (0.30)
Beach 0.11 (0.15) 0.22 (0.26) 0.11 (0.15) 0.22 (0.26) 0.10 (0.14) 0.22 (0.26)
Number of observations 1179 222 604 97 575 125
standard errors in parentheses
statistics corrected with sampling weights
Table 1: Individual characteristics with respect to rosca participation
6All the 496 households we surveyed represent 2083 individuals of which 894 are
aged less than sixteen, we are thus left with a sample of 1179 individuals divided in
604 women and 575 men. We show in Table 1 relevant statistics according to gender
and participation status. These are used as variables on which is based our econometric
analysis. One can ﬁnd a detailed description of some of these variables in Appendix
9.2. We see an important difference in terms of age: mean age of total sample is sig-
niﬁcantly (at 5%) lower than those of rosca members. Women seem less educated than
men as a signiﬁcantly smaller proportion of them got a primary degree. There is also
a larger proportion of male salaried, this being true whatever the participation status.
Differences in monthly income show that rosca members are signiﬁcantly richer than
non members, this remains valid in the female subsample and in the male subsample
for monthly expenses. It appears as well that female rosca members are in charge of
larger households than female non members.
3 Secrecy and Individual Decisions within Household
At the time of our detailed survey, we carried out several informal meetings with resi-
dents of Vossa and Enagnon which showed us that secrecy is the rule between spouses.
An important proportion of women and men with whom we spoke in these two poor
neighbourhoods of Cotonou said that their spouse was unaware of the course of their
occupational activities and was thus unable to guess their income. Many said, no mat-
ter the gender or age or the respondant: ”the less he/she knows about my activities, the
better it is.” Or ”I don’t want him/her to know my income otherwise he/she will ask
me to meet the cost of such and such expenses.” Spouses are overwhelmingly secretive
and it even seems that giving as little information as possible to his/her partner is quite
natural. Hence, rarely do spouses ask questions concerning their partner’s income or
inquire about their activities. It is a kind of convention allowing each member of the
couple to keep her income more or less secret. It seems the main reason for this is to
give each individual as much latitude as possible in managing personal income. Thus
by being secretive spouses avoid sharing their personal earnings or making common
budget and retain the sole control over their personal expenditures.
We included questions pertaining to this in our survey and addressed these to 587
respondants (out of 1179) being at least sixteen of age and in couple. To the question
”Can you estimate your spouse’s revenues?” : 79% answered no, 11% yes and 10%
partially. Results were similar for: ”Do you think your spouse knows your revenues?”:
76% answered no, 16% yes and 8% partially. This evidence allows us to depict union
or couple as an arrangement made between two persons in order to provide for their
respective needs in terms of public goods and to those of any children.
Another remarkable fact that we came across is that contributions to public goods
7are often made in Benin according to local social norms ﬁxing the intra-household al-
location of expenses items according to gender. The majority of these devolve to the
husband who should take care of everything related to the house (rental fees, repair
costs, electricity), give money for housekeeping, pay the school fees, clothing, etc. His
wife should take care of the family, cook and pay water bills. In general, male income
is not sufﬁcient to cover the needs of the family, so that the wife has to spend more for
the household than what had been allotted to her.
As long as the basic needs of the family are fulﬁlled, selﬁsh6 individuals would
prefer to spend more on private goods, the utility of which is superior. Each spouse tries
to depart from the status-quo expenses by passing on to the other some share of their
common burden. They then enter an inﬁnitely repeated non-cooperative game where
each spouse tries to lower his/her contribution to the provision of the public good as it
is detrimental to his/her own consumption of private goods (savings included).
In order to implement this strategy each one of them hides their income and tries to
give the partner a blurred image of their earnings. This implies that spouses also hide
as much as they can their expenses otherwise it could lead one’s partner to have a guess
of his/her revenues. Were one player able to know their partner could spend more for
the household, they would claim to pay less. Therefore, none of the spouses gets incited
to reveal the true amount of their earnings.
This is not to say that spouses do not interact with one another concerning the pro-
vision of public good they provide. A minimum of common management is required
in a couple with respect to their respective gender role in the couple. But it remains that
spouses avoid disclosing information on their income and their expenditures. Hiding
revenues can appear an easier task than hiding expenses. However as a large frac-
tion of couples don’t interact during working hours because their work brings them in
different parts of the city, meal expenses, transportation or medicines, transfers for rel-
atives or collegues, gifts for funerals and momentary luxury spendings such as alcool
and cigarette can easily be concealed. Moreover even larger expenses can be kept away
from spouse knowledge. As we show in Table 3 almost half of rosca members invest the
pot in their small business. A woman buying stocks of provisions to store can conceal
them in her shop, taxi drivers paying for regular motorcycle or car repairs or ﬁshermen
buying new equipment can easily hide their investments.
Secrecy as strategic information transmission (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) prevents
the household to beneﬁt from efﬁciency gains usually reachable with the repetition of
the game. The Folk theorem indeed claims that cooperative outcomes are sustainable in
inﬁnitely repeated non-cooperative games as long as the discount factor is not too high
but in this case as neither incomes nor strategies are observable, no such pareto superior
outcome can be reached. In these conditions, detection of fraud or deviation from the
6’Selﬁsh’ is to be taken in the sense that utility of one agent does not depend on any other agent’s utility.
8cooperative agreement is in fact rendered impossible. This explains why agents may be
stuck in a pareto-inferior equilibrium, supported by social norms7. Both spouses have
thus no incentives to reveal their real income or personal expenses (which could lead to
rough estimations of the earnings).
We observed these behaviors as widespread and accepted to such an extent that few
are those who try to break this tacit rule and inquire about their partner’s income. A
selﬁsh spouse will thus individually decide whether or not to join a rosca. This decision
depends on their available income net of public goods expenses and on other relevant
individual characteristics.
4 Commitment Device Against Self-control Problems
According to two different economic theories, agents might prefer to commit them-
selves and limit the set of options available to them. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001 and
2004)presentadynamicconsistentpreferencesexplanationofthisphenomenon, namely
the temptation theories according to which an agent undergoing short term temptations
in conﬂict with their long run self interest would be ”unambiguously better off when
ex ante undesirable temptations are no longer available” (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001,
p.1406). And even if they do not expect to succumb to the temptation in the future,
individuals with self-control problems will expend resources to remove tempting alter-
natives from their choice sets (ibidem, p.1420). In this case, preference for commitment
arises from a desire to avoid temptation rather than from a change in preference.
The second approach, well known in the literature8, departs from the dynamic con-
sistent preferences hypothesis and corresponds to a reversal of the preferences when
the date of decision-making approaches. It appears from psychological experiments
that people tend to have present-biased preferences (the shape of which is roughly hy-
perbolic) and discount time at a non constant rate (higher in the very short than in the
longer term)9. An individual having self-control problems and being sophisticated (be-
ing aware of the problem and its consequences) would prefer to commit herself. Her
current self may want to restrict the choice set available to her future selves to overcome
such time-inconsistencies.
Roscas seem to respond to a need of commitment against one’s time inconsistency
preferences and temptations. According to Gugerty (2003), in the absence of alternative
7The threat points of this game consist mainly of reputation losses: wives can complain to their parents-
in-law (and then to their own parents) about their son, unable to provide decent living conditions to his
family. Her husband endowed by custom with most of the burden is able to force his wife to provide a
bigger share in the family budget. Would she refuse to make efforts she in last resort could be repudiated
(which would mean the end of her social life and bearing important consequences thereof).
8see among many others, Laibson (1996, 1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)






9commitment savings strategies, people having self-control problems and being sophis-
ticated turn to rosca as they would indeﬁnitely renegotiate with themselves10 if trying
to save money on their own. This is supported by empirical evidence from a random-
ized control methodology study in the Philippines. In fact, Ashraf et al. (2004) show
women with time inconsistent preferences desire commitment savings devices. They
are indeed more likely to take up the SEED product which is a pure commitment sav-
ings product (bank account with restricted access to deposits without compensation for
this restriction), this leading to higher savings levels. Moreover, Ashraf et al. show that
poorly educated individuals with hyperbolic preferences are more likely to join roscas.
Besides rendering the current savings illiquid and safe, roscas restrict the set of fu-
ture options, as long as the end of the cycle is not reached, compelling the individual
to go on saving. Unfortunately we are unable to formally test the hypothesis according
to which individuals in our sample would have hyperbolic preferences. However we
have empirical evidence which strongly suggests the need of a commitment device. In-
deed 89% of the rosca members (198 out of 222), answered that they joined a rosca to
discipline themselves to save. ”Discipline” or ”the willingness to force savings” being
by far the most cited answers suggest that a vast majority of members use the rosca as a
mean to commit themselves to economize.11 Despite the evidence we provide in Table
3, according to which all members use the pot for non durable expenses, the answer
”buying an indivisible good” came short as only 22.5% of all participants mentioned it
as the reason of their membership.
Moreover the fact that 60% of rosca members prefer to receive the pot at the end of a
cycle provides an additional argument. Of all those who preferred being at the end 78%
said it was because they did not want to feel indebted towards the group. They consider
receiving in the early turns of a cycle as a debt towards the group to be repaid by future
contributions to the pot and as a situation that they would prefer to avoid (this answer
was provided without any proposed list of answers). This certainly conﬁrms the incen-
tive and disciplining role of the group which is exerted through pressure from the peers
towards a defaulting member. It demonstrates as well that for a substantial number of
individuals, beneﬁts from an early reception of the pot are outweighted by the risks of
defaulting and being punished, this shows that sanctions represent an effective threat.12
In our sample, fear of sanctions is thus an important factor inﬂuencing preferences on
10At each period, the current self would have present-biased preferences towards consumption and
would renegotiate the savings decision made by the previous selves.
11Multiple answers could be provided by participants as to why they joined a rosca. Even then we still
ﬁnd that discipline is the most cited motive representing 52% of all answers. There was no list of proposed
answers or suggestions to that question.
12Groups have different ways of coping with payment problems depending on whether the member
in default has already received the pot. Further details on those sanctions can be found in Dagnelie and
LeMay (2005).
10the timing of pot reception13 and at the same time, it is a key element for making a rosca
a good commitment device. The effectiveness of threatening with observed sanctions
provides additional evidence supporting this rationale of commitment device. Would
member put too much value on potential sanctions they would quit the rosca and try to
save on their own and we would notice high turnovers. But this is not what we observe:
the average membership duration of all those who provided this answer is 47 months,
and only 4.4% said that they joined the group for a ﬁxed number of cycles (the vast ma-
jority not knowing how long they were to stay member). This suggests that members
by staying in a rosca deal with the fear of sanctions as if it is indeed a commitment tool.
Furthermore many members told us in informal interviews that apart from sanctions,
receiving the pot at the end of a cycle provides in itself additionnal motivation to make
payments and complete successfully a cycle.
5 Conjectures
Important implications can be derived from the intra-household consumption behavior
that we depicted earlier. It allows us to put forward a strong conjecture that we intend
to confront with our empirical ﬁndings. We claim that each individual makes decision
about his/her own consumption and saving. Secrecy protects individual earnings to a
large extent from spouse pressure and gives husband and wife a very limited ability to
bias his/her partner’s choice. In the absence of a common decision over an aggregated
household budget, spouses have the latitude to make decisions about their savings as if
they were single. They both have the ability to manage their income according to their
respective will. This allows us to formulate a conjecture :
Conjecture 1 The probability of joining a rosca does not depend on whether an individual is
single or in a couple.
A great deal of latitude is left to both husband and wife in terms of managing their
income net of public goods expenses and deciding if they are going to join a rosca or not.
Thus the probability of joining a rosca boils down to a function of individual character-
istics: income, age, schooling, stability of one’s job and the number of persons taken in
charge. Simple predictions can be made on the effects of these variables. As saving is a
normal good, income will positively inﬂuence the probability of joining. However we
expect that rich individuals would rather opt for a formal and less risky vehicle of sav-
ings. A bank account in either a private bank or a public institution14 offers more ﬂex-
13This preference is not correlated to the duration of the group membership and therefore not likely to
be related to any learning effect.
14The Beninese National Post Service, the CLCAM (a National Co-op offering loans and saving accounts)
are among other public institutions present in Cotonou.
11ibility and a more secure vehicle than roscas informal arrangements. So for high levels
of income we expect the probability of joining to fall having thus an overall inverted-U
shape curve with respect to income.15 Age would also follow a quadratic pattern: the
needs to save would be maximum for middle age individuals establishing a family or
small commercial activities and would be expected to diminish as age increases. The
number of persons one has to take care of has an ambiguous effect on the probability
of joining a rosca. A larger number of children would give higher incentives to parents
for saving in order to face future indivisible expenses, conversely more children would
involve additional expenses and reduce potential savings. Variables describing job’s
stability16 would be positively linked to the probability of joining. More stable income
entries over the past means that one individual expects to be able to commit themselves
more easily to regular payments to the pot.
Should the commitment motive be valid, we would expect rosca participation and
rosca contributions to raise with individual income. It is likely however that both of
them are concave in income as less risky opportunities become available. Besides we
have to admit that this would prove to be a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for
certifying our hypothesis. As income rises agents would tend to further protect them-
selves against increasing temptations. Moreover, sophisticated individuals would want
to overcome time-inconsistencies by restricting their current self facing a wider set of
choices available to their future selves. This forms a second conjecture:
Conjecture 2 At least at low levels of income, payments made to roscas by individuals in need
of a commitment device will be positively linked to income.
In the next section we confront our conjectures with empirical ﬁndings coming from
our beninese database.
6 Empirical Results
We test our conjectures with our data by estimating participation and contributions
with a single procedure: Heckman Full Information Maximum Likelihood17. As peo-
ple self-select their participation to a group, the observations taken into account in the
15Our data show that, for the ﬁrst income quantiles, practically no individual has a bank account con-
trarily to a maximum of 26% of individuals in the highest quantile.
16To check this, we use two binary variables: one takes value 1 if the individual keeps her job for 24
months or more and another one takes value 1 when the individual receives regular wages.
17We preferred this technique to Ahn and Powell semi parametric estimator (whose ﬁnite sample prop-
erties are barely known) as it is likely not to perform better than Heckman FIML in such a sample (around
1200 observations and a level of censoring about 80%). (see Fern´ andez Sainz, Rodriguez-Poo and Vil-
lan´ ua Mart´ ın, 1999) Moreover, Ahn and Powell does not produce a 1st step estimate which is of primary
importance in our analysis.
12structural equation are not a random sample. In fact, we suspect unobserved individ-
ual characteristics to inﬂuence both the probablility to join and the amount contributed.
We have therefore to tackle the problem of selection bias, producing inconsistent esti-
mates, induced by the correlation between the error term and the regressors. Heckman
FIML addresses this problem by simultaneously estimating the selection and structural
equations, allowing residuals to be correlated.
As FIML rests upon a hypothesis ofindependence of observations which is not guar-
anteed by the design of our survey carried in three different areas, we introduced ﬁxed
effects removing the area-speciﬁc component from the residuals and eliminating the en-
dogeneity caused by unmeasured area characteristics. (Pitt et al., 1999) As errors within
those neighbourhoods are likely not to be independent, we used cluster effects taking
account of correlation between observations coming from the same environment. This
produces robust standard errors which would have been understimated without this
correction. Furthermore, the design of our survey was such that the probability of be-
ing selected in our sample was different in the three studied areas which could lead to
inconsistent estimates. We thus introduced sampling weigths for our estimates to be
independent of the sample design. (Deaton, 1997)
13HECKMAN FIML ESTIMATES OF PARTICIPATION AND MONTHLY CONTRIBUTION
All sample In couple All sample In couple
1st step: participation
Female -0.195 (0.180) -0.056 (0.447) 0.192 (0.653) -0.054 (0.444)
Couple 0.218 (0.273) -0.171 (0.210)
Female * Couple -0.144 (0.092) 0.401 (0.357)
Individual income (1000 CFA) 0.008 *** (0.003) 0.006 ** (0.002) 0.008 *** (0.003) 0.006 *** (0.002)
(Individual income)2 -7.34e-06***(2.14e-06) -5.16e-06***(1.68e-06) -7.43e-06***(2.10e-06) -5.20e-06***(1.88e-06)
Female share of household income -2.099 (1.518) -2.407 (1.529)
(Female share of household income)2 1.709 (1.228) 1.981 (1.249)
Age 0.096 *** (0.013) 0.039 *** (0.006) 0.098 *** (0.013) 0.041 *** (0.011)
(Age)2 -1.03e-03***(0.20e-03) -4.39e-04**(1.73e-04) -1.05e-03***(0.21e-03) -4.53e-04**(2.30e-04)
Number of persons in charge 0.023 (0.035) 0.020 (0.041) 0.022 (0.034) 0.019 (0.038)
Primary degree 0.163 (0.671) 0.102 (0.545) 0.160 (0.624) 0.098 (0.503)
Same job for at least 24 months 0.440 *** (0.020) 0.417 *** (0.021) 0.452 *** (0.020) 0.426 *** (0.045)
Salaried 0.299 (0.398) 0.275 (0.478) 0.321 (0.418) 0.317 (0.520)
Ashanti 0.304 (0.274) 0.801 *** (0.261) 0.087 (0.173) 0.608 (0.376)
Fon -0.160 * (0.087) 0.140 (0.150) -0.149 (0.101) 0.165 (0.167)
Goun -0.099 (0.142) 0.230 * (0.134) -0.101 (0.177) 0.241 (0.162)
Peul 0.343 * (0.192) -0.339 (0.446) 0.336 * (0.198) -0.333 (0.395)
Popo 0.076 (0.158) 0.416 (0.378) 0.067 (0.118) 0.412 (0.350)
Vossa -0.512 *** (0.077) -0.584 *** (0.074) -0.534 *** (0.051) -0.626 *** (0.051)
Enagnon -0.626 *** (0.166) -0.784 *** (0.136) -0.643 *** (0.156) -0.824 *** (0.117)
Constant -3.099 *** (0.549) -2.013 ** (0.831) -3.115 *** (0.429) -1.403 *** (0.210)
1
42nd step: monthly contribution
Female 5849.2 (3734.8) 97.5 (748.6) 390.8 (10651.9) 31.3 (879.7)
Couple -5410.7 (4062.8) 17.4 (10408.7)
Female * Couple 1429.1 (1477.6) -778.4 (4855.0)
Individual income (1000 CFA) 59.5 ** (29.1) 63.8 *** (22.7) 65.1 *** (9.6) 68.3 *** (6.5)
(Individual income)2 -6.29e-02***(1.82e-02) -6.64e-02***(1.18e-02) -6.64e-02***(4.60e-03) -7.01e-02***(4.63e-03)
Female share of household income 4763.0 (12958.1) -631.1 (11694.4)
(Female share of household income)2 780.5 (11896.2) 5348.2 (13241.4)
Age -1138.2 (1000.4) -561.2 (705.9) -1171.3 (972.5) -618.6 (811.8)
(Age)2 12.5 (10.8) 5.8 (7.6) 12.8 (10.2) 6.3 (8.5)
Number of persons in charge -462.2 *** (58.1) -389.1 ** (187.0) -486.5 *** (123.3) -389.6 * (225.1)
Same job for at least 24 months -2257.3 (4055.5) -2487.6 (4351.5)
Ashanti -5620.0 * (3194.1) -7835.7 (6395.3) -3445.8 *** (1027.3) -6425.5 (4486.3)
Fon 543.4 (2345.3) -3000.5 (4248.4) 644.4 (2260.0) -2680.1 (4148.9)
Goun 540.2 (3512.1) -1737.9 (2732.2) 664.5 (3326.2) -1454.1 (3036.4)
Peul -4663.6 * (2469.4) 2249.3 (6071.5) -4441.3 ** (2263.2) 3172.3 (6944.7)
Popo -1062.4 (2151.0) -2328.3 (5616.7) -790.7 (1851.3) -1843.6 (5151.7)
Vossa 7550.5 * (4319.5) 7374.1 * (4464.9) 7822.5 * (4632.1) 7645.3 (5060.2)
Enagnon 4669.8 (4839.6) 4488.0 (4944.3) 4820.1 (5065.3) 4671.9 (5394.1)
Constant 34408.7 (35056.6) 22467.4 (28108.6) 35114.8 (33722.2) 22680.5 (25633.7)
Number of observations 1179 587 1174 582
Number of censored observations 957 530 953 426
Number of uncensored observations 222 157 221 156
standard errors in parentheses,
*** signiﬁcant at 1%,
** signiﬁcant at 5%,
* signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 2: Heckman FIML
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5The ﬁrst part of Table 2 gives empirical estimates with respect to participation which
is the dependent variable of the ﬁrst step18. We regress alternatively with respect to the
whole sample size and then with a subset incorporating only members of a couple.
The only difference between the ﬁrst two columns and the last two is the addition of
two regressors namely female share of household income and its square. We control
for ethnic afﬁliation even though we think that it plays a minor role in rosca participa-
tion in Cotonou as only a minority of groups are designed along ethnic patterns. These
variables can be seen as very rough proxies for social identiﬁcation and networking.
Neighbourhoods are also controlled for and account for all potential interactions and
effects speciﬁc to Vossa and Enagnon19. We include additional regressors such as the
number of persons in charge, which is a proxy for household expenses. Since this vari-
able is not signiﬁcant, none of the interpretations presented before is conﬁrmed. We
checked whether education would have any effect: it appears not to have any as the
variable ’Primary degree’ is not signiﬁcant for any regression. Stability in one’s job,
which we measure by whether one has kept one’s present job for at least 24 months,
affects positively and strongly the probability to join a rosca. Being salaried (not self-
employed) is however not signiﬁcant. The district ﬁxed effects, Vossa and Enagnon, are
strongly signiﬁcant suggesting that unobserved factors speciﬁc to each neighbourhood
are important. A look at all the regression results also show that ethnic identity is rarely
signiﬁcant which conﬁrms our impression that native language and ethnic ﬁliations are
not a strong determinant of rosca participation.
Most importantly, these estimates allow us to validate our ﬁrst conjecture. In the
ﬁrst column the coefﬁcients displayed show that neither couple nor the interaction vari-
able between female and couple are signiﬁcant. An alternative regression displayed in
the third column conﬁrms these results. Indeed it strengthened the validation of our
ﬁrst conjecture by showing that the variables female share of household income and
its square are not signiﬁcant at 10% controlling for the same individual characteristics.
This certainly provides evidence in favour of our framework where the decision to join
a rosca is individual and independent of marital status consideration20.
As anticipated, rosca participation is quadratic in income. However the maximum is
reached at a very high level of income indicating that for most of our sample the proba-
bility increases in income. Indeed only ﬁve individuals out of 1179 have a larger income
18Although both equations are estimated simultaneously, for clarity, we will use 1st and 2nd step to refer
respectively to the selection and structural equations.
19Time spent in a neighbourhood could also represent a proxy for trustworthiness. However problems of
convergence with FIML technique prevented us from using this variable. It is to be noted that individuals
in our sample tend to have a rather long stay in their respective neighbourhoods with a mean of almost
sixteen years: see variable ”Number of months same block” in Table 1. Movements across neighbourhoods
and migration are more of an exception than usual observation.
20We also ran a test of joint signiﬁcance on coefﬁcients of couple and female * couple. Results do not
allow us to reject joint non-signiﬁcance at a 10% level.
16than the maximum of this quadratic function. The income variable used in all our re-
gressions is a measure of individual earned income including transfers. Our inverted-U
shape prediction concerning age is also veriﬁed, the relationship begins to decrease at
46 years of age. This tends to conﬁrm that demand for indivisible expenditures is in-
creasing among young agents and decreases as they get older21.
The second part of Table 2 displays estimates with respect to monthly contribu-
tion22. The dependent variable is the monthly equivalent of the total amount of CFA
francs given to all the roscas in which a member participates. Regressors such as ethnic
dummies and district ﬁxed effect are overall non signiﬁcant. Other personal charac-
teristics: gender, age, job stability and female share of household income have no sig-
niﬁcant effect on contributions. Clearly from our four different regressions only three
variables account for rosca contributions: income, income square and the number of
persons in charge. These results are all intuitive knowing that both decisions of joining
and contributing are independent as we show below. Once an individual has decided
to join a group based on her characteristics, she will decide the amount to contribute
according only to economic variables. Higher income would potentially lead an agent
to save more and thus make larger contributions whereas a very fortunate agent would
at some point turn to formal banking and reduce her rosca contribution. Conversely
having more children or persons to take care of will reduce savings for a given income
and thus reduce payments made to rosca. Rosca contributions are quadratic in income,
but the maximum value of its inverted-U shaped curve is this time larger than the high-
est income value of all rosca members. Income has thus an exclusively positive effect
on contribution in our sample and this conﬁrms our second conjecture. Indeed as in-
come increases one individual in need of commitment against temptation or self-control
problems will raise the total amount of his contribution.
Empirical results are in accordance with our rationale: secrecy and non-cooperation
allow spouses to make individual decisions concerning their expenditures net of public
good spending and hence to commit themselves according to their available revenues.
The decisions to join as well as to how much to contribute are undoubtedly individual.
Apart from FIML estimations we ran a test on the independence of residuals be-
tween both equations (the ﬁrst and second step). The hypothesis that both equations
residuals are independent is not rejected with a p-value of 55% for the corresponding
statistic. This suggests that the decisions to join a rosca and the amount one will con-
tribute in such a device are independent. This may be due to the fact that an agent may
21Note that 2003 estimates for the life expectancy at birth in Benin is 53 years. (Worldbank, 2005).
22Monthly contributions will vary from one individual to another. They often have the choice among
several roscas to choose from, each requiring a different contribution. Moreover individuals can decide
to belong to several roscas, which is the case for 6% of all rosca members in our sample. Additionally a
member can give multiple contributions in one rosca and thus receive the pot more than once during the
same cycle. This is allowed in 29% of the roscas in our sample.
17have the choice among a set of roscas in his neighbourhood and others known through
colleagues, friends or relatives and that the selection among these is made with respect
to the amount contributed. Being familiar with other members is the predominant cri-
terion in group selection. Indeed in our sample 68% of all rosca members said that they
had selected the group they are in because they knew or had links with other members.
The second most cited answer to ”why did you choose this speciﬁc rosca?” is because
its president was known for well managing the group (14%). Following in importance
are answers related to the amount of contribution (12%) and the strictness of the rules
(10%). Once individuals have identiﬁed groups in which they are familiar with some
or all members and likely to trust them, they will join the one(s) more suitable to their
saving preferences.
It can be argued that rosca participation can inﬂuence one’s income, not directly
since savings placed in a rosca bear no interest but indirectly through social connections
or others beneﬁcial side effects and through returns on investment made with the pot.
About 26% of all 222 members answer that they experienced some extra economical
advantages by participating in a rosca: 18% say that fellow members prefer to buy at
their shop or doing business with them and 6% say that they have met their employer
(past or present) in the group. These answers tend to conﬁrm that roscas provide social
connectedness and that they can bring additional advantages. However measuring the
importance of these side effects is practically impossible. To account for such potential
beneﬁts on income and thus endogeneity with respect to the probability of joining a
group we have carried out the same regressions as in Table 2 by replacing income with
expenses on non durable goods (mainly food and other weekly expenses such as gas
for cooking, transportation, etc). This way we instrument income by a variable which
can be considered as independent of such extra beneﬁts. Results from these regressions
are similar to the ones we obtain and also conﬁrm our two conjectures.
7 Other Reasons for Joining a Rosca
While we think that the need of commitment device represent the main motive explain-
ing rosca participation in our sample, literature has provided other motives for joining.
7.1 Quick Financing of the Purchase of Durable Goods
As argued in Besley, Coate and Loury (1993), roscas allow individuals to receive the pot
earlier than through individual savings and thus to buy the desired indivisible goods
before it would have been possible ’in autarky’. This of course being the case for all
members except the last one in the cycle. Ex-ante roscas having a non-predetermined
order, either because they are bidding or random type roscas, make all members better
18off in expectation by saving through them. Once the indeterminacy of the entire cycle
order is unraveled the last is ex-post worse off presuming that the saving rate imposed
by the rosca is not optimal for him. Observations collected in Benin do not support such
hypothesis. Out of the 183 roscas included in our dataset 50% have their entire order
known before the cycle begins, before any cotisation has been paid. In those cases, when
the cycle starts there is no uncertainty about the timing of the pot reception. Either the
order is determined by the governing body in a decision rosca according to various
reasons (ponctuality, good payment records, seniority, member of the governing body,
etc). Either in a random rosca the entire order is chosen randomly and known at the
beginning of the cycle. Thus as the cycle starts, the median cycle length being 11.54
months, the last recipient could well decide to opt out ex-ante knowing to be worse off.
Backwards induction would then predict the breakdown of the rosca.23
Another piece of evidence rendering the Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) reasoning
unﬁt to the Beninese case is that only a minority of 24% of rosca members in our sample
declared that if they could choose they would prefer to receive the pot at the beginning
of the cycle while a majority of rosca members (60%) preferred the end.24 For those
wishing for an early reception of the pot we do not rule out the Besley, Coate and Loury
rationale but it remains that this motive is more of an exception.
While the quick ﬁnancing rationale is unﬁt for our data, saving through these asso-
ciations is done in order to make an indivisible expense. As displayed in Table 3, this
appears to be the case from our investigations even though as evoked before, it is far
from being the most mentioned motive for joining a rosca25. We proceeded by asking
all rosca members what they did with the pot during the present cycle or what they
intended to do with it if their turn was to come. Nearly all of them reported that they
bought or were willing to make an indivisible expense: 49% mentioned investment in
their small business (buying important stocks of provisions for stores, motorcycle or car
repairs for taxis, equipment for ﬁshing, etc), 18% planned to repair or build a house,
11% reported lot purchasing, 7% paid for school tuitions 26), 5% planned to reimburse a
23In our sample, 93% of all roscas change the order after each cycle is completed. That is to say the order
of pot reception is rarely repeated from cycle to cycle. But this does not change our argument. For half of
the roscas having no uncertainty with respect to the order, members motivated by an early reception of the
pot can still decide to opt out, whether or not the cycle order will be repeated.
246% declared prefering to receive the pot at mid cycle and 12% were indifferent. Of those prefering to
receive ﬁrst in the cycle: 61% said that they would rapidly invest the pot and ease the payment of future
contributions with the proﬁts earned, another 25% said that they could rapidly repay debts or enjoy the
beneﬁts of having the pot.
25Contrary to Gugerty (2003) who ﬁnds that more than half of rosca participants in her kenyan sample
use rosca winnings for two or more purposes, offering thus evidence that roscas are not formed solely to
purchase lumpy durable goods. We observe that only 14% of rosca members intended to use the pot for
more than one purpose. For details, see Table 3.
26The fact that school fees represent such a low percentage is explained by the fact that a majority of
19All members Women Men
Don’t know yet 0.02 0.01 0.03
Tuition fees 0.07 0.06 0.07
Health expenses 0.02 0.02 0.02
Financial aid / debt 0.05 0.07 0.02
Luxury expenses 0.05 0.08 0.03
Party / funeral 0.03 0.02 0.03
Brideprice 0.00 0.00 0.01
Lot purchase 0.11 0.10 0.12
House repair / building 0.18 0.08 0.26
Small business 0.49 0.72 0.30
Travel expenses 0.02 0.01 0.02
Other durable good 0.14 0.03 0.23
Other 0.02 0.03 0.01
Number of observations 222 97 125
Table 3: Pot Uses (multiple answers)
personal debt and 14% to buy a durable good. What is meant by ”other durable good”
is any type of object or commodity such as tv set, radio, mobile phone, etc.
Incidently if we look at answers provided by women, we ﬁnd that 72% of them
made (or intend to) an investment in their business27. Men’s answers are more diversi-
ﬁed, they mainly use the pot for business, house repair or building, other durable goods
and lot purchase. One can notice the signiﬁcant difference between male and female ex-
penditures on small business, other durable goods28 and on house repair and building
which is likely related to the customary expenses pattern.
Besley and Levenson (1996) tested a hypothesis according to which, controlling for
income, the rosca members would possess more durable goods than non members. We
ran similar tests on the durable goods possessed by the households (such as fridge,
freezer, stoves, tv set, vcr, stereo system, radio, bed, clock, watch, telephone, mobile
phone) but obtained no signiﬁcant differences between members and non members. A
public schools ask for very small tuition fees. For other selective schools, ﬂexibility is allowed by which
high fees can be paid in several instalments.
27Despite the fact that proﬁts from these investments may eventually beneﬁt the household, this statistic
does not coincide with the notion that women would join a rosca in order to save primarily for their
children or the household’s well-being.
28The large difference between ”small business” and ”other durable good” with respect to men and
women is likely to be exaggerated since answers provided by a proportion of men could be counted in
both categories.
20look at Table 3 tells us that a large majority of pot uses do not lead to durable goods pur-
chases for the household, for which we tested the Besley-Levenson hypothesis. Indeed
durablespurchasesappearinthecategories”otherdurablegood”or”luxuryexpenses”,
which represent only 19% of all pot uses. The majority of pot uses being targeted to-
wards indivisible expenses do not translate into accumulation of such goods.
7.2 Insurance
Another motive for joining a rosca is that such an association can act as a substitute
for insurance. This interpretation is mainly valid for the case of bidding roscas and not
for random or decision roscas. Bidding roscas is indeed the type of rosca which can
accomodate best the allocation process and the timing of pot reception with respect to
member’s speciﬁc shocks. In our sample only random (64%) and decision roscas (36%)
are represented, bidding roscas being seemingly absent in Cotonou. However random
and decision roscas can provide insurance to a small extent. Indeed some ﬂexibility is
provided by allowing a member in need to receive the pot at an earlier round. Of all the
roscassurveyed26%stipulatedintheirrulesthatchangesintheorderingwaspermitted
and to be agreed upon by either consensus of all members or by the governing body.
Moreover 44% of all roscas allow two members to change order without knowledge of
the rosca’s governing body or any other member. This opportunity seems to be used
since 12% of the rosca members said there has been at least one exchange of place with
another participant in their group during the last cycle.
Roscas can also provide insurance by offering loans to their members. Indeed 20%
of all roscas offer this possibility in their rules. In the vast majority of those associations
(94%) a loan can only be offered to a member who has not yet received the pot. On top
of that, conditions are often imposed (72% of groups) as for what reasons the loan can be
granted (sickness, ﬁnancial problems, funerals, accidents, etc).29 Loans were regurlarly
solicited in groups offering this opportunity : during the last six months 58% of them
granted at least one loan.
Decision roscas, both those imposing an order for the entire cycle and those making
meeting-to-meeting decisions often consider desires and needs of members. Of all 65
decision rocas, 53% base their decision on each individual member’s needs.30 Of course
this insurance aspect is enhanced for roscas based on meeting-to-meeting decision. A
member to whom something unexpected happened and who has not yet received the
29In all cases no formal collateral (such as belongings) is required. The pot to be received by this member
acts as such. Indeed the amount granted is often limited to the pot and deadline payment coincide with the
time of pot reception or the end of the cycle. 58% of these loans are granted without payment of interest.
Before granting a loan 72% of all roscas carry on investigations to check the truthfulness of each demand.
30Other criteria for such a decision are : good payment records and punctuality (30%) and seniority
(11%).
21pot can come to a meeting and formulate his demand. For roscas ﬁxing the entire or-
dering before the cycle begins the insurance they can provide is limited. It can only
take into account foreseen or potentially known shocks. For instance, they can take into
account harsh ﬁshing seasons and make pot reception for ﬁshermen coincide with it.
Even though these two types of roscas have tried to accomodate some insurance
aspects in their functioning, once the pot is received and a shock occurs, there is lit-
tle if nothing available.31 Roscas are therefore an imperfect substitute for insurance.32
Instead surveyed Beninese tend to resort to indemnity funds33, a major informal insti-
tution for insurance services.
7.3 Intra-household Conﬂicts
Anderson and Baland (2002) present a model of intra-household conﬂicts in consump-
tion decisions. In their cooperative bargaining framework there are asymmetric pref-
erences for household goods regarding men and women who share a common bud-
get. They model a conﬂict within the household for an indivisible good based on those
asymmetries : women having always a larger preference for the indivisible good and
therefore willing to save at higher rate than men. Members being an overwhelming
majority of female34, as they observed in Kenya, would join a rosca in order to ren-
der savings out of reach of their husband (or hiding them) and buy an indivisible good
which they prefer. Whereas men would rather opt for present consumptions. By joining
a rosca, women thus commit the household’s income against the husband’s preferences.
This however does not seem to comply with the evidence we collected in Benin.
On the one hand, our dataset shows that women have a slightly smaller probability
of being in a rosca than men: while they represent 51% of all adults, women form a
minority (45%) of all rosca members. In Cotonou the probability that a woman partic-
ipates in a rosca is 15%, this slightly increases to 21% when she lives in a couple and
22% if she works (24% if she does both). Compared to that men have an overall prob-
ability of 19% of participating in a rosca, 32% when they live in a couple and 31% if
31Some roscas do offer additional help called ”alˆ o j` e nude ji hun enan” (24% of the roscas in our sample).
One member in need can raise her hand and tell the group which kind of problem she has to cope with.
The group might give her a ﬁnancial help which needs not be reimbursed. This help is closer to solidarity
than insurance since its granting is uncertain and its amount widely variable.
32Contrary to our ﬁeld observations, Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) ﬁnd a prevalence of bidding roscas
in an Indian city and stress their insurance role. See also Klonner(2001)
33LeMay (2005) presents an analysis of those groups based on this Beninese household survey. These
groups, called in Fon ”nuj` e m` eji gbˆ e” (a direct translation of which would be ”happiness-unhappiness
funds”), offer insurance against a wide range of shocks.
34This bias towards female participation is also conﬁrmed by other studies such as Ardener (1964) -
offering several case studies located in India among others - Geertz (1962) and Tsai (2000) who respectively
focus on Java and China.
22working (35% if both). There is also no tendancy towards favoring women in group
composition: 18% of all roscas surveyed were exclusively composed of women while
26% exclusively of men. For the remaining of groups composed of both genders 63%
have a majority of male members. Moreover from the general groups’ anatomy that we
can depict from this large scale survey we cannot assert that roscas are primarily ori-
ented towards women’s needs neither do they intend to favour their membership. We
met no group having clear primary objectives such as assisting women, providing for
their needs or those of children or enpowering women in their interactions with their
husband. 35 This is conﬁrmed by the coefﬁcients we obtain using the Heckman FIML
displayed in Section 6. Indeed neither female nor female * couple variables are signif-
icant36 in the ﬁrst step of our regressions. This showing that gender does not seem to
be a relevant variable explaining participation to roscas. Combined to that, these vari-
ables are still non signiﬁcant in our second step estimates. This would tend to show
that household’s members seem not to exhibit asymmetric preferences with respect to
saving decisions.
On the other hand, were roscas used as a mean to put money aside from the hus-
band, membership would have to be kept secret from the husband’s knowledge. In our
sample, most roscas meetings are only open to members but groups do not insist upon
secrecy showing that participants are not primarily seeking to commit money against
spouses. Indeed only 15% of the membership due to people living in a couple (71% of
all rosca memberships) is unknown by spouse.37 In order to avoid potential disputes
concerning mainly adultery issues, 40% of groups allowing female membership impose
husband’s approval for new female members. Moreover 56% of the groups organize at
the end of a cycle (or of the year) a celebration with dances and folklore where friends
and neighbours are invited. Even deﬁles or marches preceed those celebrations to at-
tract attention from people in the neighbourhood. It can also serve to advertise the
success of their association and generate new memberships.
One could still argue that roscas would be a tool for hiding revenues to one’s part-
ner. This could be the case for a minority of members as 29% of them declare the con-
tributed amount to the pot is unknown to their partner while 54% of them say the time
of receiving the pot is not known. Although roscas could be a tool for helping secretive
partner in hiding money, these ﬁgures do not suggest it would be a widespread motive
35Neither did any group attempt to elaborate a strategy of expense for their members in order to favor
any gender or ethnic group. In fact no group imposed spending scheme or favored goods deemed valuable
to them. Latitude as to what can be bought with the pot is large: rules limiting the pot use are rarely
imposed (in only 2% of all roscas).
36A test of joint signiﬁcance run on female and female * couple variables prevents us from rejecting joint
non-signiﬁcance of these variables at 10%.
37Gugerty (2003) ﬁnds similar evidence. In her kenyan sample roscas have a structure that is not de-
signed to encourage secrecy among spouses. Gugerty also presents evidence against the intra-household
conﬂict hypothesis.
23for joining a rosca38.
7.4 Alternative Explanations
A view that can also arise from our framework is that roscas would simply be used to
help spouses reducing their contribution to the provision of public goods for the house-
hold by putting money out of reach. In this case we would expect the probability of
joining to increase with the expenses on public good that the household has to face. The
variable number of persons in charge is a good proxy for such public good expenses.
This rationale is however not supported since in all of our regression results this vari-
able is largely non signiﬁcant. It is not that we discard entirely this interpretation of
rosca participation but we clearly give it a lesser value than our main argument of com-
mitment device against self-control problems.
A signiﬁcant proportion of members we interviewed, declared that it was impossi-
ble to save money if they were to leave it home (see also Anderson and Baland (2002)).
Indeed, it would disappear in various expenses. Savings would quickly evaporate due
to all sorts of social pressures and demands coming from the entire family, friends and
neighbours. Ranging from ﬁnancial help for a friend, payment for medicines for an
uncle, to unexpected claims by children, ﬁnancial help can be requested on a regular
basis. Demands could as well come from the spouse and roscas would help agents to
commit against those claims, but the household budget structure and secrecy are such
that this kind of claims is greatly reduced. By opting for a rosca, one opts for a socially
accepted alibi to protect one’s savings against all types of social pressures. This was also
observed by Platteau (2000) and was developed by Ambech and Treich (2003). In our
sample, 20% of members mentioned that they joined a rosca for protecting their savings.
That can mean two things that can not be discriminated: on the one hand, protection
against potential income sharing and social pressure from relatives. But on the other
hand, it can also mean protection against risks of theft, ﬁre or other catastrophies which
were also evoked during informal interviews. To reduce risks people would prefer not
to save at home and put money out of reach in a rosca which would serve as a mean to
protect earnings against such adversities. Far from being the most important answer ex-
plaining members’ participation, which is as we show commitment against self-control
problems, the fact that one out of ﬁve members emphasizes protection certainly gives
credit to this alternative rationale.
38In fact this answer was not given by a single of the 222 members in our sample to the question: ”What
is the fundamental reason why you joined a rosca?”.
248 Conclusion
Our empirical evidence shows that rosca participation is not a gender issue in Cotonou
and that the decision to join a rosca is made individually in a such a way that each
spouse retains the control over his/her spendings. This has to be taken into account by
policies that would be designed to favour any gender participation. Recent studies have
stressed the fact that roscas are used as a commitment device against two categories of
potential threats. Individuals would join roscas to protect themselves against external
threats such as pressure from their spouse coming from asymmetric preferences (An-
derson and Baland, 2002) or social pressure (assistance to relatives or friends) as em-
phasized by Ambec and Treich (2003). Alternatively, agents would like to secure their
income against internal threats such as temptation and present-biased preferences, both
preventing them from saving, which is detrimental to their long term well being. Our
investigations underline that rosca participation in Cotonou is primarily aiming at pro-
tecting members against their self-control problems. Despite the fact that we did not in-
clude direct questions on time inconsistency over preferences in our survey, our results
suggest that self-control problems are widespread and that people in the poor districts
that we surveyed value savings commitment mechanisms such as roscas. Indeed the
willingness to discipline savings came out as the most expressed motive among roscas
members. Projects favouring the establishment of formal saving and commitment ve-
hicules in Vossa and Enagnon, and certainly in other poor districts of Cotonou would
most probably meet with success.
9 Appendix
9.1 Survey Methodology
We selected households according to a random process. In Enagnon we succeeded in
obtaining a map of the city and performed a simple selection of a lot according to an
implemented random process. In these two districts it often happens that many house-
holds live on the same lot in semi-detached rooms. Enumerators selected one room on
a lot according to a clock-wise selection varying from lot to lot (for the ﬁrst lot of the
day they selected the ﬁrst room clock-wise, for the second one the second room clock-
wise and so on). In Enagnon-plage and Vossa we used a pseudo-random process by
which every tenth lot according to a speciﬁc direction was picked and then room selec-
tions were done in a similar fashion as in Enagnon. Overall only 3 households categori-
cally refused to be surveyed and were replaced by other randomly selected households.
Enumerators were asked to pass several times and at different moments of the day, un-
til contacts were established in such a way that none of the selected household was
skipped. The most qualiﬁed of our enumerators also acted as a supervisor and visited
25many households already interviewed in order to check the accuracy of the responses.
Other than that we analysed every completed questionnaire closely. Several appoint-
ments were held with each team of enumerators and in case of incoherence or lack of
answers we regularly sent them back on the ﬁeld. Questionnaires often needed succes-
sive rounds of checks until ﬁnal approval. As mentioned above we emphasized the fact
that the interview with every single household member had to be carried in his/her
sole presence in order to get as precise and reliable information as possible. Fear of di-
vulging information in front of other members would have led individuals to lie or to
refuse to answer. On average our four teams of two enumerators completed two ques-
tionnaires a day. The taking account of intra-household secrecy greatly lengthened the
survey by requiring speciﬁc appointments with each adult member. Another time con-
suming factor was the detailed part of our questionnaire concerning groups: we often
needed more than an hour for a single group. We compensated every household for
their precious time by donating 1500 francs CFA. Finally, with two previous missions,
in 2002 and 2003, we carried out about eighty group interviews. We attended regular
meetings or met members of their governing body in order to get a better understand-
ing of their functioning.
9.2 Deﬁnitions of Key Variables
Live in couple: Individual having a partner (married or not) who is member of the house-
hold. Those who were engaged in a couple for whom the spouse was not living in the
household and for whom we did not have any data were not considered to live in cou-
ple.
Salaried: Individual is salaried if he/she receives a salary on a regular basis (either
daily, weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, bi-monthly, etc) in the formal or informal sector. Only
12% of all individuals are salaried and there is an important gender difference: 22% of
men are salaried and only 3% of women. Women are massively self-employed in our
sample.
Individual income: Monthly sum for each individual of all income-generating activ-
ities including those from formal and informal sectors and those from self-employed
activities. It also included earnings from interest on loans made, rents on house or
apartment and received transfers. In our overall sample only 10% work in the formal
sector, being either employed privately or by the state.
Number of persons in charge: Total number of people within the household depending
ﬁnancially on either member of the head couple. It is thus the sum of children (aged less
than sixteen years), young adults having no revenues or any other depending relatives.
For example a member of the extended family moving in the household and relying on
its members for a living is counted as such.
26Job length: Indicates that one individual has had his/her present principal income
generating activity for at least twenty four months.
Primary degree: Indicates that one individual has completed primary school.
Individual share in couple income: Each individual’s income divided by the sum of
both spouses’income.
Expenditures: Monthly extrapolations from the sum of all expenditures made on non
durable goods during one week. It includes 1) all expenditures on food (including ex-
penses on heating and cooking such as coal or gas) and 2) luxury expenditures such as
cigarettes, alcohol, eating and drinking in hotels and restaurants.
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